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DOES LAWFUL ACT DURESS STILL EXIST? 
 
WHEN can a threat to do something lawful constitute economic duress? It seems like a simple enough 
question, but it is one with which the courts have continued to struggle. The Court of Appeal in Times 
Travel (UK) Limited v Pakistan International Airlines Corporation [2019] EWCA Civ 838 (TT v PIAC), has 
recently provided guidance on when a lawful threat will not constitute economic duress. It held that a 
threat made in good faith by a company in a monopoly situation did not constitute illegitimate pressure 
for the purposes of economic duress, even if that threat were potentially unreasonable. Considering the 
rarity of successful lawful act duress cases, TT v PIAC is a leading decision on the (limited) circumstances 
where a threat to do something lawful can render a contract subsequently entered into voidable.  
Times Travel (TT) was a small family-owned travel agency in Birmingham. Its business predominately 
sold return flights to Pakistan, and Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) was the only 
provider of direct flights between London and Pakistan. TT was therefore highly reliant on PIAC and 
would have been unable to continue business without selling PIAC tickets. In 2008, TT entered into an 
agreement with PIAC whereby it was authorised to sell tickets (“the Original Agreement”). The 
commission rate was initially 9% of the ticket price with additional commission payments as an incentive 
for total sales. The Original Agreement also gave both parties the right to terminate on one month’s 
notice. There were ongoing issues with the commission structure and payment and, later in 2008, a 
trade union of PIAC-appointed agents formed to negotiate a deal with the airline. During this period TT 
regularly chased PIAC for payment of outstanding commission. PIAC reassured TT that, despite the 
introduction of a new commission scheme, the outstanding commission would be paid.  
In 2010 the trade union threatened legal proceedings against PIAC. PIAC advised TT not to get involved 
in this dispute and reassured it that a solution would be reached. On 14 September 2012, PIAC sent a 
notice of termination to all UK agents, including TT. This notice also set out the terms of re -appointment 
(“the New Agreement”).  TT had earlier asked for a copy of the New Agreement, with a view to 
obtaining legal advice in relation to it, but this was refused. A few days later PIAC reduced TT’s allocation 
of tickets from 300 per fortnight to 60 until the New Agreement was signed, which occurred on 24 
September 2012. This agreement provided for a 7% commission which was only payable after specific 
sales targets were met. The initial period of the New Agreement was 6 months, but PIAC orally agreed 
that it would run “well into the future”. The New Agreement also released PIAC from all claims to unpaid 
commission or remuneration arising out of the Original Agreement. PIAC indicated that if TT did not sign 
the New Agreement, the travel agent would no longer be able to sell PIAC tickets.  
At first instance, it was held that TT was entitled to avoid the New Agreement on the grounds of lawful 
act economic duress. Warren J. outlined the three elements of economic duress: (i) illegitimate pressure 
on the claimant, where that pressure was (ii) a significant cause of the contract being made, and (iii) the 
claimant had no reasonable alternative but to enter into the contract. Despite the fact PIAC had not 
acted unlawfully, at first instance Warren J. held that the combination of factors was sufficient for a 
finding of economic duress. The judge stated that it was “moot” whether PIAC had acted in good or bad 
faith. He held that the claimants had not established bad faith, and that different minds would have 
competing views on whether the airline’s actions amounted to bad faith. Instead, he attached particular 
significance to the fact that while TT’s benefit from the New Agreement was sufficient to justify the new 
arrangements going forward, it was inadequate for TT to waive existing claims against PIAC.  
The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court decision. PIAC did not challenge the judge’s finding that 
the second and third elements were present in the case. The only issue to be considered was whether 
TT was subject to illegitimate pressure, which required looking both at the nature of the threat and the 
nature of the demand. The Court of Appeal commented that if the threated action is lawful (such as 
PIAC’s threat to reduce TT’s ticket allocation), the nature of the demand must be considered. It further 
held that lawful demands made in good faith could not constitute illegitimate pressure for the purposes 
of economic duress. When determining good faith, the focus would be on whether the demand was 
made honestly as opposed to reasonably. The extent of ‘reasonableness’ was not however tested, thus 
leaving open the question of whether a demand made with an absurd – but honestly held – belief of 
legal entitlement could be categorised as legitimate pressure.  
A further issue left open in the wake of the Court of Appeal’s decision is the difficulty in defining when a 
demand is made in “good faith”. It seems that PIAC’s belief (reasonable or otherwise) that it was 
entitled to retain the unpaid commission was sufficient for the court to hold that the demand was made 
in good faith. Nothing else appeared to be necessary for this finding and there was limited analysis of 
the foundations of good faith. As the English courts are still in the process of developing these principles, 
there is a potential danger in relying on the absence of good faith when determining what constitutes 
economic duress (see also comments from Leggatt J. in Al Nehayan v Kent [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm)).  
Referring to CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallagher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714, the Court of Appeal’s decision 
was also premised on the basis that whilst lawful act duress is possible, it would be “unprincipled to 
develop the doctrine of economic duress as a means of controlling the lawful use of monopoly power” 
[107]. Putting aside the debate about whether the common law does and should regulate this type of 
power, the role of economic duress is to prevent the misuse of power – including when it arises from a 
monopoly position. Just because PIAC was a monopoly, it does not mean that the company should be 
afforded free rein to utilise its privileged position without fear of an economic duress finding. There 
were many actions from PIAC that appear to go beyond mere use of a monopoly power and could easily 
be interpreted as misuse of its position justifying a finding of illegitimate pressure. These include: 
reassuring TT that outstanding commission would be paid; encouraging TT not to get involved with the 
trade union; reducing the ticket allocation until TT signed the New Agreement; not allowing TT a copy of 
the New Agreement to obtain legal advice; and using the New Agreement to release PIAC from liability 
for outstanding commission that had validly accrued under previous agreements. Hopefully, even in the 
world of commercial bargaining, these actions can clearly be “distinguished from the rough and tumble 
of the pressures of normal commercial bargaining” (DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services ASA 
[2000] BLR 530 [131], Dyson J.).  
It is surprising that the Court of Appeal was not directed to the case law on economic duress in salvage 
cases, since an interesting parallel can be drawn. In salvage cases, the court can set aside or amend an 
otherwise binding contract if the ship in distress was so desperate that they had no alternative but to 
consent to a salvage agreement that was inequitable, disproportionate or exorbitant (J. Reeder (ed.), 
Brice on Maritime Law of Salvage, 5th edn (London 2012), [5-121]-[5-127]). In The Cargo Ex Woosung 
(1876) 1 P.D. 260, a ship was wrecked on a reef and the Captain entered into an agreement with the 
salvage boat to give over half the value of any items saved. This was significantly more than standard 
salvage agreements, but it was unlikely that any other ship would reach The Woosung in time to assist. 
After the salvage was completed, the Captain refused to pay the agreed amount and offered a sum 
closer to standard salvage agreements. The Court of Appeal held the transaction to be unenforceable. 
Even though the captain was “perfectly capable of understanding” the nature and consequences of the 
salvage agreement, the agreement was not enforced as the Captain had no choice but to accept “the 
lesser evil of losing a portion of the profit and property being submitted to rather than the greater evil 
of losing all” (at 265).  
A strong parallel can be drawn between the desperate situation of TT, a small business dependent on 
PIAC to survive, and a sinking ship needing help to salvage items in peril. In the latter case, despite the 
complete legality of the salvage agreement obtained, the boat was not entitled to the spoils of the 
contract. The court justified intervention not on the ground of fettering the lawful use of the salvage 
boat’s monopoly position, but on the fact that the salvage boat took advantage of a situation and 
utilised its position to obtain a disproportionate benefit. Whilst the lawful use of a monopoly position 
will not necessarily ground lawful act duress, could it not be argued that the misuse of such power ought 
to entitle the court to analyse the outcome of the agreement reached and consider a finding of lawful 
act duress.    
Those who strongly value commercial certainty will welcome this decision as a continued focus on 
orthodox freedom of contract principles. Those who believe that contract law can and should be used as 
a tool to set a minimum standard of acceptable behaviour may despair that this decision could be the 
removal of another plank from beneath the feet of lawful act duress.  
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